Analysis of Guru Gobind Singh Ji's battles
The enemy commanders by sheer body of numbers intended to storm the camps at Paonta Sahib earlier then anticipated to achieve surprise and capture it in a lightening attack by day. Since such a large scale was not anticipated in such short notice, all round defence of the most important ground could not be organised, and therefore, having given adequate defensibility to Gurus camp, Guru Gobind Singh Ji decided to meet the enemy at a known piece of ground where mock exercises and rehearsals of contingency plans has been conducted earlier.
The enemy was made to believe by counter intelligence moves that the Khalsa army was not stepping out of Paonta Sahib to give fight, therefore the enemy forces advanced without adequate caution.
Safeguarding the security of the rear i.e. Paonta Sahib under three able commanders namely Ram Kaur, Mehra and Kalla, Guru Sahib Ji divided the rest of his Singhs into three groups under Kirpal Chand, Sangho Shah and Bhudhu Shah with adequate reserves.
Reserves were suitably positioned and subsequently employed at the right time to tilt the odds to Guru Sahib Ji’s favour.
Commander Sangho Shah, under the personal guidance of overall commander in chief Guru Gobind Singh Ji, made the best tactical use of the ground and positioned his troops on the home bank of a steep ravine which served as a ramp for holding back the enemy forces and met the enemy on the ground of his choosing.
Before positioning his men, Guru Sahib Ji made use of the prevalent wind direction resulting in increase in the speed and consequently the range of the arrows which killed hundreds of enemy practically rolling down a steep hill.
The enemy at the pre-selected ground was engaged at three different points from different directions by well balanced jathas/groups resulting in the division of the enemies strength consequently thinning out of the enemies front. Confusion and panic reigned in the enemies ranks and gave a deceptive impression of the strength of Gurus ji’s troops. The correct positioning of artillery pieces – two wooden batteries*, which shelled stones and pounded the enemies exposed flanks had devastating effect.
(* Ram Singh, a mechanic from Banaras had made the cannons for Guru Sahib Ji from which balls were discharged with great effect during the battle – Macauiffe, The Sikh Religion)
The result of the battle was that it put the military preparedness of Guru Ji to the test and by his brilliant victory it emboldened his Sikhs to face the titanic struggle which lay ahead of them with added courage and confidence.
Lessons learnt from the battle were :
1. That rehearsed contingency plans with troops for the defence of vital ground had a far reaching effect on the course of the battle.
2. The commander’s constant effort and success to meet the enemy at the ground of his choosing has all chances of success.
3. Counter intelligence maneuvers can help achieve surprise.
4. Adequate reserves, their suitable positioning and employment at the right moment i.e. without showing the hand prematurely can tilt the heaviest of odds into ones favour.
5. Widespread, bold and daring attacks on the enemy, who although vastly superior in numbers forced them to deploy his forces in a manner that inherently thinned out his front lines and thus weakened them.
6. The deployment of artillery in a manner aimed to concentrate fire power on vulnerable parts of the enemy (instead of peppering the whole enemy) has a more devastating effect.
7. Intelligent use of obstacles may by natural or manmade or a combination of both, help impede the advancement of the enemy and thereby break his momentum.
8. Prevalent wind’s speed and direction, weather conditions must be kept in mind and corrections applied before employing weapons for accuracy and resultant advantage.
Leadership
1. A leader can infuse great will and determination even amidst an atmosphere of gloom and defeat by personal presence and forceful expression. The desertion of the treacherous Pathans and Udassis group damped the spirits of the troops, but Guru Gobind Singh Ji’s fiery, courageously invigorating speech just before the battle helped equip his Singhs psychologically with renewed fervour, zeal and rare courage.
2. Personal example of bravery influences men more than anything else. Guru Gobind Singh Ji was wounded by Raja Hari Chand in the midst of battle, but Guru Ji unmindful of his wound arrowed Hari Chand to death and continued to be with his Sikhs during the entire course of the battle.
3. A commander can exercise substantial influence on the course of a battle only when he either has direct observation of the battle or has reliable means to appreciate it in its true perspective in order to direct the operation in an ever changing situation. Guru Gobind Singh Ji observed the progress of the battle from a vantage point and directed operations as well as personally going into battle with his troops.
The battle of Bhangani
The forces came face to face at a place known as Bhangani, 10kms from Paonta Sahib. The Hill Rajas allied army numbered around 10,000 men while Guru Gobind Singh Ji initially had 2,000 men at his disposal. But before the battle broke out, 500 treacherous Pathans with their commander Bhikan Khan and equal number of men from the Udassi sect deserted Guru Ji’s Khalsa army. The former joined the opposing army and the latter were never heard of again. So, the ratio turned out to be practically 10:1, although Bhudhu Shah came to Guru Ji’s assistance with his sons and a contingent of troops. This ratio has more significance then as is does now, due to the mere fact that every soldier came in physical contact with the enemy during the course of the battle.
4th Battle of Anandpur (March, 1704)
Guru Gobind Singh Ji’s plan was as follows :
Guru Ji’s Khalsa carried out attrition on enemy rank and file by bold attacks far away from the main defences of Anandpur, both by day and night. This was done as the enemy advanced to Anandpur, slowing them down.
Knowing that the enemies intention was to loot and plunder the city, left all bulky and heavy property while animals and lighter valuables were carried away to safety, with the aim to let the enemy weigh down their animals laden with the heavier goods. This was intended to ensure that the enemy on the return journey would not be able to employ his war animals of horses, elephants and camels. The enemy would thus be reduced to foot infantry completely devoid of battle mobility.
Strong mobile patrols making use of unused jungle and mountainous tracks were to shadow the army and finding the most opportune moment to pounce with total surprise. At Bhalon, 14kms from Anandpur such an opportunity did arise when the Mughal army were merry making late into the night. Khalsa patrols pounced upon them from all sides shouting battle cries and discharging arrows causing confusion, havoc and panic in the enemy ranks.
Tactical lessons.
Tactical lessons learnt were, that attrition on the enemy carrier out systematically by the defender, employing all means at the longest possible range far away from the main defences not only impedes advance operations of the attack force but also demoralises the enemy long before they have even had a chance to engage in battle.
Well trained troops grouped as strong patrols, especially in mountains can perform a variety of tasks. They have element of surprise and can cause havoc as quickly as they retreat into the jungles.
Night attacks with high standard of field craft demand vigour, control and resourcefulness on the part of both leader (Jathedhar) and led (jatha).
Balanced combat columns while moving dispersed and concentrating on the enemy from different directions preferably against his weaker or soft spots, like a moving octopus, will invariably unhinge and unnerve the enemy.
In rapidly changing tactical situations, where time is at a premium, there should be viable means to ensure percolation of orders down the chain of command. This avoids confusion and tasks are executed as per the plans of the commander.
In a withdrawal operation, various ways and means to achieve a clean break in order to avoid enemies advance turning into a pursuit must be employed. 5kms away from Anandur Sahib a strong mobile jatha under the command of Baba Ajit singh Ji attacked on the northern exposed flank of the army. The attack was so fierce and bold that the advancing army partially came to a halt in order to engage in this suddenly developed threat. There was then time for the main Khalsa force to carry out a tactical withdrawal in organised groups as strong protective patrols, knowing fully well preselected places and routes of withdrawal.
Leadership.
Any commander’s job is half done if by employing tactics he succeeds in marring the battle field mobility of his enemy. This can be achieved by separating the mobile element (cavalry) from the foot infantry of the opposing force or restricting or destroying the inherent mobility if the manoeuvring elements.
A successful leader will have insight into his enemy and how to exploit their mistakes. One acquires this by experience, maturity and knowledge gathered through intelligent study. Guru Gobind Singh Ji was well versed with his enemies habits , temperament and reactions to various situations.
Demoralisation of the troops when carrying out withdrawal operations result in carelessness and uncautiousness, this must be avoided and guarded against, all round alertness at all times invariably saves many lives and prestige of any force.
5th Battle of Anandpur (May, 1704)
Organised commando raids in strength on the enemies administrative areas and collecting sizable amounts of food stock to supplement the cereal stores of Anandpur which were initially just enough to last a month or so. The raids were organised and carried simultaneously by a number of jathas to cause confusion. Nahar Singh and Sher Singh with a band of brave Khalsa entered deep into the main camp of general Zabardast Khan and Ajmer Chands forces in which they gave a lightening blow. Also before leaving they untethered the enemy horses and injured their elephants causing chaos as the animals trampled underfoot.
By organising effective patrols by night and observations by day, any enemy efforts to drive a wedge into the main defences were thwarted.
Under pressure and compulsion from within Guru Sahib Ji decided finally to abandon the defences through a safe passage promised by the allied forces despite knowing the hollowness of such promises and religious oaths given by the allied commanders. To ensure maximum security Guru Sahib Ji organised his Khalsa, numbering approximately 1,000; out of which only 500 were mounted, in vanguard, read guard and flank guard for the protection of the main body, which primarily consisted of chariots and carts carrying women and children clad in men’s clothing.
When the enemy, unmindful of their promises, encircled the small force of Guru Ji on the open flat ground, the flank and rear guards heroic fight held the enemy at bay and did not allow them to get to the main body. Finding a opportunity Guru Ji and the main body headed to cross the river Sarsa. The turbulent river swollen due to recent torrential downpour posed a major obstacle.
In order to negotiate the river a strong contingent took positions on vantage points to ensure a clean break from the chasing army. Bulk of the force meanwhile, in various groups waded across the river on horseback. The chasing armies follow up was very speedy. Although they could not engage the wading force due to delaying elements of the Khalsa, they overcame then due to sheer numbers and waded across the river in order to regain momentum of the attack.
Since, time was of a premium and a storm in full rage , Guru Sahib Ji could not reorganise his troops after crossing the river and with only 150 horsemen, including Baba Ajit Singh Ji and Baba Jhujar Singh Ji entered Roper state. The forces of Roper engaged Guru Sahib Ji’s contingent, after a quick encounter and disengagement, Guru Ji with his remaining 40 men reached an old havaili at a place called Chamkaur.
Analysis.
Well planned and daringly executed commando raids by trained troops on enemies logistics administrative dumps, even when the enemy has the upper hand, can unnerve them and have far reaching effects. The allied force commander, having lost a sizeable amount of his food stocks due to the Khalsa raids, moved his their supplies approximately 35kms away from Anandpur and deputed a large force for their protection. Carriage of food over such a large distance and storing escorts burdened the enemy.
Efficient, proactive and well coordinated patrols by night ensure security of the defences.
The security of the main body during advance operations depended on :
Mobility and balance characteristics of the force constituting front, rear and exposed flank guards.
Correct spacing of groups, keeping the terrain and threat in mind.
Determination of troops.
Deception and surprise.
The basic elents of one foot on the ground and the other on the move inherent in various drills, when exploited in letter and spirit can ensure safety from even pursuing forces. The element of file and move tactics in the drills practiced by Guru Ji’s Khalsa while clearing the river Sarsa avoided the enemies chase turning into a pursuit.
Leadership.
Commanders who share equally the adversities and hardship of their troops and face them boldly and cheerfully invigorate the morale of those under their command. The Khalsa army was on starvation rations for two months in which even the edible leaves of trees and bark were consumed. Guru Gobind Singh Ji and his family did not have an privileged items and took the same rations as were given to the troops.
Mental perception to see through the battle trickery of the enemy commanders can avoid disasters and capture enmasse. Guru Gobind Singh Ji mental discernment of impending danger in the allowance of safe passage by the allied force commanders on religious oaths and promises and consequently his organisation for the protection of the main body to ensure its safety even when a force of a few hundred were encircled on flat terrain by an army thousands strong meant that they main body crossed the river in relative safety.
Local women, children and unarmed citizens must be given adequate protection by the evacuating force and not left to the mercy of the enemy. Guru Sahib Ji’s main body consisted of chariots and carts carrying local women and children which could not be sent out of the fort earlier.
Sentiments have no place in battle. Guru Sahib Ji had correctly appreciated that the enemy was very badly demoralised and on the verge of breaking point seeing no results of their seven month long siege and that within a few for days the enemy commanders would have lifted the siege unconditionally, but those within the Gurus command had insisted that they take up the offer of the enemy and evacuate Anandpur sahib.
Battle of Chamkaur, 1704
The Khalsa Force:
Organising all round defence of the ghari, Guru Ji himself occupied a position on the top story of the house to observe and engage with the enemy with his arrows and direct the defence operation. As long as there was ammunition with Guru Ji and his troops, no enemy soldier could come close.
Days were short but there was still 3 to 4 hours of day light left when the ammunition was beginning to be exhausted. In order to keep the enemy at bay Guru Ji divided his men into groups, each of which was to go out and fight the enemy with his personal weapons, sabres, spears, sword or lance. These groups were to operate in different directions one after the other to keep the enemy guessing. It was intended to ensure that the enemy did not storm the house from all sides before last light. Guru Sahib Ji’s sons, S. Ajit Singh Ji (17 years) and S. Jujhar Singh Ji (15 years) personally led such dare devil attacks and kissed martyrdom after putting many an enemy to sleep with their chivalrous, brave and powerful strokes of sabres and lance. By night fall the Ghari was held by only Guru Sahib Ji and elven soldiers.
Escape and Evasion.
Guru Sahib Ji had made up his mind that it was time for martyrdom and prepared to lay down his life for the Khalsa but the Sikhs approached Guru Ji in a group of five, evoking the Panj Piaray. With caution they told Guru Ji that he must leave the ghari and gather together the Sikhs once again, that much work still needed to be done and Guru Ji was desperately needed by his Sikhs. Guru Ji was confronted by the Panj Piaray and hence could not refuse them, reluctantly Guru Ji agreed.
A small party had more chance of escape then a large group of all twelve. Therefore only a group of 1 and 3 with Guru Ji as their leader was to escape. A Sikh ventured out down into the compound and removed the cloaks of three dead Mughal soldiers. Bare footed in the pitch black night, they were to rope down the outer wall of the Garhi. The rendezvous point was decided with the help of a star and distance towards the north into the Malwa area. Since Anandpur was already captured and towards the east was the town of Sirhand: a strong hold of the enemy and on the west lay the river Sutlej, a formidable obstacle, it was decided to proceed towards due north.
The group of three soldiers of Guru Ji’s party started their escape in the enemies dress approached the enemy camp from three different directions, undetected.
Just at this time, as coordinated, arrows from the Ghari were discharged to cause havoc and confusion, attempts were made and succeeded to extinguish the burning lamps of the enemy sentries which had illuminated the Ghari and the surrounding areas.
While running past the enemy camp in the directions of south, east and west, they individually raised load cries warning that Guru Ji, along with his soldiers, was escaping. Since by now complete darkness prevailed the allied forces were completely confused and unknowingly fell upon each other killing many. The allied forces deployed to the north of the Ghari also hearing the commotion moved towards the east and west where confusion prevailed. At this opportune moment, when there was utter confusion Guru Ji moved towards the north. Even here in the midst of such danger, high odds and great confusion Guru Gobind Singh Ji’s steely character still shone through. As Guru Ji made his escape he clapped loudly three times and announced “Here goes the pir of the Hindus, confront him he who dares,” many enemy soldiers were dispatched. Meanwhile the confusion, unrest and ghost chasing by the enemy continued till day break.
The allied commanders were satisfied to see ‘The Guru’ still sitting in the top storey of the house where he was seen the whole previous day. As it turned out a Sikh named Sangat Singh who had a striking resemblance with Guru Gobind Singh Ji had put on Guru Ji’s head dress and took position in the top storey of the building. Also, the rest of the eight soldiers had kept shooting arrows unabated in all directions to show a continued spirit of resistance and defence.
On investigation it was found that not a single Khalsa soldier had died in the night long confusion whereas innumerable allied troops lay dead. The allied forces decided to attack the ghari by sheer numbers, killed all the eight Sikhs including Sangat Singh with whom it was thought that the Guru was killed. But soon it dawned on the Subhdhar of Sirhand that Guru Ji was not amongst the eight killed at Chamkaur and he had made good his escape from a force that now numbered over half a million, as more forces had arrived from Delhi.
Meanwhile Guru Gobind Singh Ji, all by himself headed towards the Machiwara jungles and reached the outskirts of the jungle by first light of 22 nd December. The three other members of the group headed north to meet Guru Ji at the decided rendezvous point.
There after the Mughals employed all resources to capture Guru Ji but all in vain because Guru Sahib Ji covered long distances only by night on unused tracks. Guru Ji avoided villages and settlements initially and later perfectly disguised himself with the help of two loyal Pathan soldiers to make his escape.
Deductions and lessons to learn.
Astral navigation by night is reliable even when the going is in an unknown country strewn with the enemy.
Distance and direction method to determine a rendezvous point in unknown country by night is practicable.
Escape and evasion is possible with physical and mental toughness, firm resolve and commonsense. Guru Sahib Ji covered 16kms bare foot in unknown terrain full of thorny bushes by night in two to three hours and reached the pre-determined meeting place before first light.
For escape and evasion a high standard of training, high moral and psychological strength in the troops is a primary requirement.
The besieging force can be forced to lose valuable time and resources by daring attacks of groups consisting of crack soldiers, who had determination and fervour to kiss martyrdom. Small groups of Khalsa soldiers forming suicide squads held the enemy at bay for three to four hours of remaining day light by sheer personal hair-raising boldness and unimaginable valour.
Maintenance of momentum of attack is most vital for ultimate success.
A move by night must be simple in both concept and nature to avoid confusion.
Leadership.
Calm, cool and serene composure of a leader, in adverse conditions inspires confidence and removes all kinds of fear or panic in the troops. Guru Gobind Singh Ji was not at all perturbed facing such heavy odds and maintained complete tranquillity of both mind and soul.
The knowledge of prominent physical features of the entire combat zone including those of the enemies terrain is important for the commander. Escape and evasion in unknown country then is a feasible proposition. Guru Sahib Ji headed in the right direction and the right time avoiding capture.
Battle of Mukatsar. May 1705.
Relative strength – 10:1 The Muhgal army numbered 20,000 and Guru Ji’s 2,000 the majority of which were irregulars.
The Mughal forces of Sirhand having known the location of Guru Ji’s camp mounted an attack by day with an aim to wipe out irregular soldiers and to capture Guru Sahib Ji alive.
There was only one water point in the vicinity for miles around. As it was semi-desert terrain and the summer heat was reaching its peak Guru Ji knew of its importance and based his defences around the water hole.
Realistic mock defences or extended false frontages were established at a place in the direction of Sirhand reasonably away from the water source. Deceptive methods like stretching out of sheets on trees and shrubs attracted the Muhgal army and their commanders took it to be the enemy’s main camp.
Khalsa soldiers numbering around 250 – including the forty soldiers who had earlier deserted Guru Sahib Ji in the great siege of Anandpur Shahib and had rejoined Guru Ji’s army, now poised to give their very best before laying down their lives out of sheer repentance and remorse – entrenched themselves well to form a perimeter defence with perfect camouflage and concealment. They engaged the Mughal army for the whole day.
The Moghal army, after clearing the outer perimeter which they regarded as the main defences were tired and without water. At this opportune moment Guru Ji’s fresh cavalry contingent, suitably poised on the enemies route to the water hole, engaged it. With this daring attack the enemy became so disorganised that it was never possible for the enemy commander to reorganise and march upon the actual camp or defences of Guru Ji.
Tactical Lessons.
Water sources, points of communication and maintenance in the desert or semi-desert terrain are few and far apart, hence strategically important. Defence should therefore be based on or around axis of maintenance with an aim to deny the opposing forces accessibility to them.
False and deceptive but realistic extended frontages can lure the enemy to mount an attack and thus waste effort and time.
Good camouflage and concealment ensures security of defence and helps achieve surprise. Because of camouflage and concealment of the main defences of the Khalsa army, the enemy mistook and wasted time and effort on false frontages established on the only approach route available to the Mughal army.
Employment of fresh troops in order to maintain the momentum of attack against an exhausted and bruised enemy invariably disorganises and demoralises him. Only a 300 strong cavalry contingent for fresh troops attacked a thirsty and exhausted enemy numbering 16,000. This had a dramatic effect on the outcome of the battle.
Well dug-in forces, mentally prepared to do or die can inflict substantial damage to the enemy both in men and materials. Some 250 soldiers of the Khalsa engaged an enemy of 20,000 strong for the whole day. The enemy no doubt put each one to death, but in the bargain left approximately four thousand dead or wounded in the day long battle.
The commander’s appreciation of the ground factor in semi-desert terrain must have the main emphasis on available axis of communications, maintenance and strategic locations, such as water points.
An effective commander can organise even irregular troops and infuse within them indomitable will to do or die and achieve tangible results. Most of Guru Ji’s troops at Khirana were primarily peasants and artisans from the neighbouring areas who had rendered their services to Guru Sahib Ji.
After the defeat of the enemy at the battle of Muktsar, the Mughals realised the futility of their efforts and became so badly demoralised that they altogether gave up. Automatically, hostility towards Guru Sahib Ji and the Khalsa army vanished never to resurface again as long as Guru ji was alive.
Guru Gobind Singh Ji’s generalship.
Guru Gobind Singh Ji’s art of warfare was swift manoeuvres against relatively larger forces to achieve complete surprise over the enemy. Critical analysis of his battle with Hussain Khan of the allied forces at the battle of Nadaun amply illustrate that the manoeuvres were not aimed to slaughter the enemy but to cause fear and panic in the enemy ranks in order to disorganise and thereby drive them from the battle field. The fleeing enemy were never given pursuit by the Khalsa army as that would have amounted to indiscriminate killing of men and therefore against the Khalsa code of conduct.
Guru Ji’s action on the battlefield repeatedly shows quick decision, rapid cavalry manoeuvres and flexibility of mind. Incidentally these three characteristics – quick decision, rapid manoeuvres and flexibility in an ever changing situation rank the most prominent ones in modern warfare.
The element of battlefield mobility, inherent in mounted weapons on horses, camels and elephants were employed in offensive roles both in nature and concept even as a defender.
A careful analysis of Guru Ji’s battles indicates that Guru Gobind Singh Ji never risked the security of the main defences in a bid to achieve mere surprise. Thinning out the main defences for creating various combat groups, aimed to hit the enemies rear and exposed flanks were well balanced and at no time were the main defences rendered insecure.
Resources, both in men and material, available to his command, although meagre compared to those of his adversaries, were always utilised to maximum advantage. Needless to emphasise that leadership ability is measured by the degree of effectiveness with which each leader employs those assets available to him.
Basic principles of objective, offensive, simplicity, unity of command, economy of force, surprise and security, morale, manoeuvrability, flexibility and so forth were always integral ingredients in Guru Ji’s plans.
As a general in the battlefield Guru Ji succeeded in forcing his adversaries to give up their purpose completely. After the battle at Mukatsar, the Mughals realised the futility of their efforts and were so badly demoralised that they gave up altogether. Hostility towards the Khalsa army vanished never to resurface again while Guru ji was alive.
Guru Gobind Singh Ji as a general never once remained away from the battlefield giving a pretext of directing the operation. Guru ji always directed and fought at the same time with the forward most rank and file of the Khalsa army. Despite mental and physical stress of day long battles, Guru Ji attended to minor details. After day long battles Guru Sahib Ji personally attended to the wounded and solemnised last rites who had touched martyrdom as his command.
The discipline of Guru ji’s army was not based upon fear or punishment but on mental awareness and realisation of their moral and patriotic duty which always exhorted the Khalsa soldier to stand at the beck and call of their leader with a will to do or die.
The victories of Guru Gobind Singh Ji can be attributed to discipline of his troops which impelled them to strictly observe the demands of the oath of allegiance and self devotion to their Guru.
Guru Ji’s army strictly observed the Khalsa Code as given by their Guru. There were numerous occasions when the Khalsa army, after victory in the battle field, could have wiped out the enemy by pursuing them, but did not resort to it as it was not approved by their leader. It speaks of excellent self control realised through a very high standard of discipline.
With Bahadhur Shahs succession to the Moghul throne, Guru Gobind Singh Ji’s military life came to a virtual end, but an epic legend in the military profession had only sprung to grow till eternity.